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Abstract
Physical theories are complex and necessary tools for gaining new knowledge about their areas of 
application. A distinction is made between abstract and practical theories. The last are constantly being 
improved in the cognitive activity of professional physicists and studied by future physicists. A variant of 
the philosophy of physics based on a modified structural-nominative reconstruction of practical theories is 
proposed. Readers should decide whether this option is useful for their understanding of the philosophy of 
physics, as well as other philosophies of particular sciences.
The article is written within the theme “Communicative transformations in modern science” of “Program-
targeted and competitive topics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine”.
Keywords: practical physical theories; physical lingua franca; subsystems of theories; subsystem 
flexibilities; main and auxiliary components; basic and satellite levels.
Модифікована структурно-номінативна реконструкція
практичних фізичних теорій як основа філософії фізики
Анотація
Фізичні теорії є складними та необхідними інструментами отримання нових знань про галузі 
їхнього застосування. Проводиться розрізнення між абстрактними та практичними теоріями. 
Останні постійно вдосконалюються у пізнавальній діяльності професійних фізиків і вивчаються 
майбутніми фізиками. Запропоновано варіант філософії фізики, заснований на модифікованій 
структурно-номінативній реконструкції практичних теорій. Читачі мають вирішити, чи корисний 
цей варіант для розуміння ними як філософії фізики, так й інших філософій окремих наук.
Стаття написана в рамках теми «Комунікативні трансформації в сучасній науці» «Програмно-
цільові та конкурентні теми Національної академії наук України».
Ключові слова: практичні фізичні теорії; фізична lingua franca; підсистеми теорій; гнучкість 
підсистем; основні та допоміжні компоненти; базові та сателітні рівні.
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1 Introduction 
The problematic situation in the philosophy 
of physics is as follows. On the one hand, 
modern physics is inconceivable without the 
use and development of theories. However, 
physicists themselves do not usually explain 
what they mean by theories. [See, for example, 
Kompaneyets 2012; Landau and Lifshitz 1981-
1986; Vakarchuk 2007]. On the other hand, many 
philosophical interpretations of theories have 
been proposed. [See, for example, Agazzi 2015; 
Balzer, Moulines, Sneed 1987; French 2020; 
Winther 2020]. However, there is no evidence 
that physicists use them. Indeed, the physical 
encyclopedias do not hold references to these 
interpretations. [See, for example, Flügge 1955-
1984; Françoise, Naber, Tsun 2006; Meyers 
2001; Prokhorov 1989-1998].
Meanwhile, an adequate description of 
physical theories is important for understanding 
the role of the philosophy of physics in the 
development and teaching of physics. The 
article is based on materials from physics and its 
philosophy. However, when the article mentions 
science in general and the general philosophy of 
science, it is assumed that statements about them 
also apply to physics and its philosophy.
2 The role of theories in science and the 
role of their reconstructions in philosophy of 
science 
Mario Bunge (1919-2020) gave a brief 
description of the importance and functions 
of scientific theories in science. “A peculiarity 
of 20th century [and surely the next centuries 
– VK] science is that the most important 
scientific activity – the deepest and most fertile 
– is centered around theories rather than around 
stray questions, data, classifications, or stray 
conjectures. Problems are posed and data are 
gathered in the light of theories and with the 
hope of conceiving new hypotheses that may in 
turn be expanded or synthesized into theories; 
observations, measurements and experiments 
are executed not only to collect information and 
generate hypotheses but also to test theories and 
find their domain of truth; and action itself, to the 
extent to which it is deliberate, relies more and 
more on theories – for the better or for the worse. 
In short, an emphasis on system – on empirically 
testable theory, of course – rather than on raw 
experience is what characterizes contemporary 
science. 
Scientific theory can be studied either as an 
activity or as a finished even though not final 
product of that activity. But it is hopeless to try to 
understand the dynamics of theory construction 
before knowing what theories are” [Bunge 2017: 
446]. 
It is not surprising that the conceptions of 
scientific theories are central to the philosophy 
of science. Half a century ago, Frederick 
Suppe (1940-) stressed that “it is only a slight 
exaggeration to claim that a philosophy of 
science is little more than an analysis of theories 
and their roles in the scientific enterprise. A 
philosophy of science's analysis of the structure 
of theories is thus its keystone; and should 
that analysis of theories prove inadequate, that 
inadequacy is likely to extend to its account of 
the remaining aspects of the scientific enterprise 
and the knowledge it provides. At the very least, 
it calls for a reassessment of its entire account of 
scientific knowledge” [Suppe 1977: 3]. 
However, a natural question arises why the 
long-term philosophical analysis of scientific 
theories carried out so far has not been reflected 
in the works of modern scientists. Therefore, 
many philosophers of science are looking for 
new arguments in favor of the necessity of 
philosophy for science [Boschiero 2020; De 
Haro 2020; Laplane et al 2019; Rovelli 2018]. 
Unfortunately, their arguments are mostly about 
a few special episodes in the history of science in 
which eminent scientists testify the importance of 
philosophy in promoting the ideas that glorified 
them. The author is not aware of the attempts of 
philosophers of science to identify and analyze 
the set of necessary components of scientific 
theories that distinguish them from narratives. 
As a rule, existing attempts highlight only a few 
components, ignoring the rest.
After the publication of the opinions of 
M.Bunge and F.Suppe, many new philosophical 
analyses of theories were proposed [French 
2020]. However, none of them received universal 
recognition.
Thus, one of the peculiarities of the 
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contemporary philosophy of science is the 
presence of many options for the philosophical 
analysis of scientific theories. In order not to 
confuse the metamodels of theories with models 
of realities studied with the help of theories, the 
first models will be called reconstructions. In 
follows I will rely on the modified structural-
nominative reconstruction of scientific theories 
(MSNR). 
The name of this reconstruction is explained 
by the fact that in it the components (structures) of 
the theory are analyzed as having definite names 
in a broad sense. Formal and informal versions 
of the named set theory [Burgin 2011] provide 
an apparatus for such an analysis [Burgin and 
Kuznetsov 1994]. Its initial variant 1) distributes 
various forms of scientific knowledge (models, 
problems, operations, estimations, etc.) across five 
heterogeneous subsystems of theories; 2) reveals 
the various connections between these forms 
and the appropriate subsystems; 3) promotes a 
defragmented understanding of the theory, within 
which its subsystems and components find their 
natural place [Burgin and Kuznetsov 1994]. 
Some details of MSNR will be described 
further. In sum, it: 1) identifies homogeneous 
subsystems; 2) takes into account both 
coordinated transformations of subsystems and 
their components; 3) opens up prospects for 
the consistent study of the development of the 
theory from the point of view of changing its 
components; 4) creates the preconditions for 
the scrutiny of widespread ideas about science 
and its development the basis of simplified 
reconstructions of theories (for example, K. 
Popper) or fuzzy sociological and historical 
conceptions (for example, T.Kuhn) [Kuznetsov 
2018; Gabovich and Kuznetsov 2019].
3 Goals of science and goals of its 
philosophy  
But what is the goal of reconstructions of 
a theory? To answer this question, it seems 
reasonable to distinguish the goals of physics as 
a science and those of the philosophy of physics 
as a metascience of physics. 
The main goal of physicists is to study certain 
domains within the framework of her/his theories 
and gain new proven knowledge about these 
domains. Such knowledge describes and explains 
known phenomena, and is also used to predict 
new phenomena in the domains of theories.
One of the main goals of philosophers of 
science is to gain metaknowledge about the 
composition of scientific theories, their types, 
properties, functions, relationships, applications 
and regularities of birth, growth and death 
[Agazzi 2009].
Explication of this metaknowledge has 
cultural, epistemological, educational, cognitive 
and didactic significance, at least for the training 
of future scientists. It seems also that adequate 
metaknowledge about theories is not useless even 
for professional scientists. After all, they not only 
read scientific texts, but besides create original 
ones, which should contain new knowledge 
presented in a specific form. This form is 
determined by what they mean by theories. In 
any case, conscious and explicit metaknowledge 
about theories is better for the production, 
presentation and understanding of new scientific 
knowledge than implicit or intuitive. Any activity 
is carried out better if its subject adequately 
comprehends its tools and conditions.
If the goal of science is the production of new 
knowledge, then the creation of an adequate picture 
of its tools, that is, the scientific theories, lays a 
solid and reliable basis for achieving the common 
goal of all metasciences. This is an increase in the 
efficiency of the generation of knowledge through 
the study of all its conditions, from historical 
to economic. Among metasciences are history 
of science, psychology of science, sociology 
of science, economics of science, axiology of 
science, teaching of natural sciences, ethics of 
science, management of science, pragmatics of 
science, culture of science etc. Their specific 
goals include the identification and description of 
essential, rather than phenomenological, patterns 
of the development of science; analysis of the 
characteristics and types of scientific creativity; 
research of the collective and communicative 
nature of scientific activity; exploration of the 
mechanisms of interaction between society 
and science; determination of criteria for the 
economic support of science and the norms of 
its effectiveness; study of both the relationship 
between various sciences and between science 
and technology, etc. 
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4 Theoretical physics and its language
MSNR uses the so-called physical lingua 
franca1, on which theoretical physics is really 
created, used, developed, and studied since its 
inception. Textbooks and scientific publications 
are written in this language2. The resources of this 
language can be used in three ways: to describe 
the studied realities, to construct theories about 
these realities, and to express metaknowledge 
about corresponding theories. This three-valence 
becomes unambiguous when the context of the 
use of words and expressions of this language is 
taken into account. For example, the referent of 
the term “wave function” can be such a physical 
reality as an electron (“electron wave function”) 
or a mathematical construction of such a physical 
theory as quantum electrodynamics (“a wave 
function as a vector of an infinite-dimensional 
Hilbert space of states describing the physical 
states of an electron”) or component of the model 
subsystem of reconstruction of quantum theory 
(“wave function as a mathematical model of the 
electron”). 
If one does not take into account the 
contexts of using the term, she/he can come to 
its identification with reality, one of the names 
of which this term is. Sometimes such a misuse 
leads to grandiose worldview consequences, as is 
the case in the conception of the multiverse. The 
interpretation of the wave function as a physical 
reality and its reduction into one of its possible 
states in the process of measuring, say, electron 
properties, which are described by the wave 
function, is added by the hypothetical assertion 
about the materialization of all its states in the 
form of the emergence of the infinite number of 
new non-interacting universes.
From a bird’s eye view, theoretical physics 
is an area of productive creativity. To obtain 
testable new knowledge, theorists do much more 
than apply and develop existing physical theories. 
They also construct new hypothetically useful 
theories based, in addition to entirely new ideas, 
on modifications of components of accepted and 
even rejected theories [Gabovich and Kuznetsov 
2020]. 
Physical theories, the network of which forms 
theoretical physics, are in state of a flux. With this 
in mind, it makes sense to distinguish between 
the abstract and the practical implementation of 
the same physical theory. Abstract theory is a 
systematized and stable repository of confirmed 
fixed knowledge about its subject area. At the 
same time, practical theory is an indispensable 
ingredient in the cognitive processes of obtaining 
new knowledge in its domain. To do this, it must 
be mutable. 
Within the framework of theoretical physics, 
practical theories are used both in the real 
cognitive activity of professional physicists and 
in the training of future physicists. Students learn 
a specific practical theory not as a self-sufficient 
system, but as related to other practical theories. 
Let us emphasize that quantum theory could not 
have been created without classical mechanics, 
electrodynamics, and thermodynamics. Its 
teaching also presupposes a fairly substantial 
knowledge of these theories.
Practical theories are presented in numerous 
and varied expositions in textbooks, monographs, 
scientific articles and conference proceedings. 
As a sign of their development, many different 
textual representations of almost any scientific 
theory appear every year. They differ not only in 
details, but in many cases also in the inclusion 
of some new scientific advances. Due to these 
modifications, new generations of future 
scientists begin their research on the basis of 
the latest theoretical advances. In fact, formally 
oriented philosophers of physics scrutinize not 
practical theories, but definite reconstructions of 
their fragments, selected on the basis of certain 
axiomatic, logical, linguistic, pragmatic, aesthetic 
and similar preferences. A prerequisite for such 
1 The physical lingua franca is not the physicalist language introduced by the logical positivists, who demanded that both physics 
and its philosophical analysis be carried out in it. 
2 An indisputable empirical fact is that the presentation of the content of existing professional works and textbooks on theoretical 
physics does not include such popular terms in the philosophical environment as "paradigm", "normal science", “revolution”, 
"incommensurability", "falsification", "proliferation", “hard core” and “protective belt”. In contrast, philosophers also use physical 
terminology (“objects/realities under study”, “magnitude/measurable property", “quantitative value”, “computable value”, “law", “model", 
"problem", "solution", "measurement", “approximation” etc.) when describing physics and its development.  
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an analysis is the consideration of an abstract 
theory as a static and isolated system without any 
changeable components. 
The harsh reality of instructing science and 
even mathematics is that no student studies 
classical and quantum mechanics, genetic, 
chemical, number and geometric theories as 
abstract theories constructed in accordance with 
some a priori principles. Moreover, in search of 
solutions to unsolved problems, no active scientist 
resorts to formal reconstructions of abstract 
theories, the abundance of which is offered by the 
philosophy of science.
In sum, theoretical physics is the natural 
habitat of practical theories. In this environment, 
a specific theory does not exist without the use of 
some other theories, but competes with theories 
with the same domain of applicability. For 
example, there are many competing theories of 
gravity. 
However, philosophers of science do 
not pay enough attention to reconstructing 
practical theories as permanently changing and 
interdependent systems.
5 Intra- and inter-theoretical flexibility
To be changeable and dependent on other 
theories, the components of practical theory must 
be intra-theoretical and inter-theoretical flexible. 
For example, a change in a model as a 
component of a theory may be driven by a 
desire to modify radically the model. In this 
case, intra-theoretical flexibility is manifested 
in the fact that a change in the model can cause 
induced changes in some other components of 
the theory. The illustration is a reformulation of 
the problem that was originally posed within the 
original model in terms of the modified model. 
An example of intra-theoretical flexibility from 
the history of physics is a reformulation of the 
problem of the stability of the solar system, when 
the planets were modelled as interacting only 
with the sun. Taking into account their mutual 
interactions made astronomers to construct new 
model, rethink in its framework this problem, and 
introduced new mathematical methods within 
celestial mechanics
Inter-theoretical flexibility is found when a 
change in theory is caused by the use of another 
theory in it. For example, the successful use 
of new mathematical tools by practical theory 
often radically expands the theory domain and 
leads to the solution of previously unsolved 
problems and the formulation of new problems. 
Considering fragments of mathematical theories 
used by classical mechanics as its components, 
we can associate its changes, for example, with 
the inclusion of new mathematical concepts 
and operations with them in mathematical 
languages of mechanics. Examples are fluxions, 
derivatives, differential and integral calculus, 
differential equations, phase flows, smooth 
maps and manifolds, Lie groups and algebras, 
constructions of symplectic geometry and ergodic 
theory [Arnold 1989]. Each of these inclusions 
prompted the construction of new models, 
within the framework of which new problems 
were posed and new methods for their solution 
were proposed. All this expanded the domain of 
classical mechanics each time. There seems to be 
no end to the changes of practical theory such as 
classical mechanics. 
Another example of inter-theoretical 
flexibility occurs when a model built within 
the framework of one theory leads to insoluble 
contradictions in it. An illustration from the 
history of modern physics is a reformulation 
of the problem of the stability of atoms, when 
atoms were viewed as consisting of nuclei and 
electrons revolving around them. This problem 
was posed within the framework of the classical 
electrodynamics model, but it was solved in the 
Bohr model of atoms with stationary electron 
orbits. In turn, this model was an impulse to 
creation of quantum mechanics.
6 The polysystem composition of 
practical theories
So, the crucial point is: What are components 
of a practical physical theory? 
Considering the philosophy of physics as one 
of the metasciences about physics, one can give an 
Ansatz of a metascientific answer to this question 
in the framework of the MSNR of practical 
physical theories [Kuznetsov 2018]. Anyway, 
the building of MSNR as a philosophical model 
of theories is only the first step in processes of 
constructing the possible metatheory which 
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domain is the network of practical scientific 
theories. This is the beginning, not the end, of a 
truly philosophical understanding of science. 
Similarly, a precondition for a physical 
answer to the question of what an atom is is to 
build some scientific model of atoms. Many 
such models have been proposed. Each of them 
is the core of the corresponding physical theory, 
which has the limits of its applicability. The 
potentially endless sequence of such models and 
corresponding theories reflects the development 
and change of ideas about what an atom is.
Practical theory as a system consists of 
components and relationships between them. If 
you start by looking at practical theories, you 
will immediately find the following. 
First, practical theory has various 
components.
Second, each component is complex on 
its own and comes with different kinds of 
subcomponents.
Third, any component is intertwined with 
others in a variety of relationships.
For example, if we take models as 
components of a theory, we find that there are 
many models in theory that are interrelated. The 
models themselves have a complex and varied 
design. They are built using the languages of 
theory and are used as a framework for setting 
the tasks of studying the modelled entities.
Fourth, it is impossible to study all these 
components and their interrelationships at once.
A good strategy is to divide the components 
into their respective subsystems and first analyze 
the subsystems separately, and then figure out 
the relationships between the subsystems at the 
component level.
Thus, given the real complexity of both 
practical theories and any of their components, 
one of the ways to study this complexity is to 
reconstruct theories as polysystems, that is, to 
decompose theories into their subsystems. For 
convenience, the name of a subsystem usually 
coincides with the general name of its main 
components. A specific subsystem includes the 
type of components that is main for it, as well as 
components of other types that are auxiliary in 
relation to the main components. Components of 
one type, which are auxiliary in other subsystems, 
are main in their subsystem. 
7 Subsystems of a practical theory
Let us describe informally and in general 
terms the subsystems (SSs) of practical theory. 
Metaphorically, each SS is a theory’s 
holographic representation that focuses on 
the main components of this SS. Its auxiliary 
components act either as “material” for the 
main components, or as methods and rules for 
transforming them. For example, models are 
auxiliary for the problem SS, since many of 
its main components are formulated in terms 
of models of domain entities. In turn, certain 
problems are auxiliary for the model SS as tasks 
of analyzing existing models or constructing new 
models. 
Theories differ in the degree of elaboration 
of their SSs. For example, at present, the 
model SSs of all string theories are in some 
sense underdetermined, since their models do 
not produce predictions that can be verified 
using modern and even designed experimental 
equipment. Changes in the components of any 
of its subsystems can provide impetus to the 
development of other subsystems of an existing 
theory. Likewise, the emergence of a new theory 
can begin with the formation of initial and 
imperfect versions of any of its future subsystems. 
The history of the development of any science is 
full of examples of such processes. 
SSs have a hierarchical multilevel structure. 
For example, a specific language is part of the 
language SS. It has basic alphabetical, wordy, 
sententional, and phrasal constitutive levels. 
There are also satellite levels corresponding to 
the actions of building, connecting, transforming 
and evaluating basic components. These levels 
include rules and procedures for the actions 
mentioned. Figuratively speaking, these levels 
are the real dark matter for most reconstructions 
of scientific theories.
SSs, their levels, components and structures 
are interdependent. As a rule, a nontrivial change 
of any component causes the induced changes 
of other components. Examples of such changes 
are model-problem and problem-problem chains. 
The first ones are generated by the reformulation 
of existing problems in terms of new models, 
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the second – by solving actual problem that 
usually has produced many formulations of new 
problems.
It follows from the polysystemic composition 
of theories that available reconstructions of 
theories focus on one or more SSs and identify 
it or them with the entire theory. Since such 
reconstructions do not consider the connections 
of the selected SSs with the rest of SSs, they 
create incomplete or partial images of even the 
selected SSs.
Let us say a few words about the theory’s SS.
7.1. Ontic SS
Each practical theory has a domain of its 
application. At any moment in the history of a 
theory, its ontic subsystem includes the notions of 
supposed entities from its domain and the notions 
of their attributes (properties, relationships, 
states, and processes). The content of this SS 
(or picture of theory’s domain) alters at least as 
a result of its experimental study. These changes 
cause corresponding transformations in other 
components of a theory. For example, the domain 
of elementary particle theory has changed each 
time with the discovery of new particles and their 
new attributes. One of the triggers of the progress 
of this theory was constructing original models 
of elementary particles as its new components. 
New models have caused changes of other 
components of this theory. There is also the effect 
of internal changes of theory on its ontic SS, as 
happens in the case of a confirmed prediction of 
new phenomena. It is assumed that prediction is 
the result of certain changes of the components of 
practical theory.
7.2 Denominative SS
Thinking about the notions of domain entities 
and their attributes, theorists use different kinds of 
entity/attribute names. The ontic subsubsystem of 
the denominative subsystem of the theory includes 
various kinds of names (labels, designations, 
acronyms, terms, symbols, diagrams, schemes, 
tables and the like), which represent in the theory 
entities/attributes from its domain. The ontic 
names of supposed entities and their attributes 
are borrowed from the national natural language 
and the physical lingua franca.
The theoretical subsubsystem of the 
denominative subsystem includes similar means 
of naming the internal components of a theory. 
Sometimes the same name denotes both the 
entity/attribute and the corresponding component 
of the theory. An example is the symbol F, which 
represents physical force and the corresponding 
vector function in classical mechanics. 
7.3 Model SS 
Models are the main components of this 
subsystem. They represent those attributes of 
the studied entities that are important for this 
study. Models are “magic lenses” through which 
scientists using a theory see entities and their 
attributes from its domain.
In a first approximation, there are verbal/
visual, empirically informative and mathematical 
models that unite in the appropriate subsubsystems 
of model SS.
Verbal/visual models are descriptions of 
entities and their attributes in terms of their ontic 
names. For example, Copernicus’s verbal model 
of the heliocentric universe uses individual and 
collective entity names (“Sun”, “Earth”, “planet”, 
“star”) and the names of an entity attributes 
(“central position of the Sun”, “planets revolving 
around the Sun”, “circular and epicyclical forms 
of planetary orbits”). 
Empirically informative models incorporate 
and order the quantitative results of observations 
and/or measurements of the attributes of the 
entities involved. 
Mathematical models of domain entities 
combine mathematical models of some of their 
attributes [Burgin and Kuznetsov 1993] in the 
form of mathematical equations. Newton’s 
second law expresses in the form of the well-
known differential equation such mathematical 
models of attributes of material bodies as force 
and acceleration (as vector functions) and mass 
(as a scalar constant or function).  
Note, that the models have their own intra-
theoretical names. 
7.5 Language SS 
This SS unites and orders languages that 
have been used by practical theory. 
Contrary to the myth about one language of 
science, each subsystem of practical theory has 
many special languages that describe its main and 
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auxiliary components. Some of these languages 
are descriptive, others are mathematical. Some 
languages are dichotomous, others are fuzzy. 
Mathematical languages of any physical theory 
are borrowed from different mathematical theories 
and in this sense are different. In any case, the 
use of mathematics in a physical theory does not 
turn it into a mathematical theory. See also above 
information about levels of a language.
7.6 Nomic SS
This SS contains formulations of laws, 
axioms, and postulates, representing in the theory 
attributes and regularities of entities from its 
domain, as well as the principles of organizing 
and changing the theory itself. 
7.7 Notions of the rest of SSs
In the spirit of the above informal descriptions, 
it will not be difficult for the reader to get an 
informal understanding of the composition and 
functions of the rest of SSs. These are definitional 
(formal and informal, full and partial definitions 
both of the entities/attributes from the domain of 
theory and components of the theory); ordering 
(deductive, inductive, abductive, taxonomic and 
the like means of ordering other subsystems 
of the theory); problem (problems, questions 
and tasks that are formulated and solved by 
theory); operational (operations both with the 
components of the theory and with the theory 
itself); procedural (procedures as rules for 
performing actions); evaluative (evaluations of 
components and theory); hypothetical (plausible 
hypotheses taking by theory); heuristic (useful 
but not well justified heuristic considerations); 
approximate (approximations of the theory and 
its components) and connecting (connections of 
both subsystems and their internal components) 
subsystems.
I invite readers to identify and describe these 
subsystems in the scientific theories known to 
them.
Conclusion
The philosophy of any particular science, 
formulated in terms of a modified structural-
nominative reconstruction of practical physical 
theories, seems to be closer to the practice of real 
sciences than other versions of it. The author and 
his colleague Alexander Gabovich plan to give 
in the near future, within the framework of this 
reconstruction, a detailed presentation of some 
aspects of the philosophy of physics and the 
philosophy of mathematics.
Acknowledgment
The author thanks doctor physical and 
mathematical sciences A.Gabovich and PhD 
student N.Vashko for helpful discussions and 
reading manuscript thoroughly. 
References
Agazzi, E. (2014). Scientific Objectivity and Its Contexts. Cham: Springer.
Agazzi, E. (2009). Pereosmyslenie Filosofii Nauky Segodnya [Rethinking Philosophy of Science Today] 
Questions of Philosophy 1: 40-52. (In Russian).
Arnold, V. (1989) Mathematical Methods of Classical Mechanics. 2nd ed. New York: Springer. 
Balzer, W., Moulines C.-U., Sneed J.D. (1987). An Architectonic for Science. The Structuralist Program. Dor-
drecht: Reidel.
Boschiero, L. (2020). Why history and philosophy of science matters. Metascience 29: 1-4. 
Bunge, M. (2017). Philosophy of Science. From Problem to Theory. Revised, Vol. 1. London and New York: 
Routledge Transaction. 
Burgin, M. (2011). The Theory of Named Sets. New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Burgin, M., Kuznetsov, V. (1993). Properties in science and their modelling. Quality and Quantity, 27: 371-
382.
Burgin, M., Kuznetsov, V. (1994). Vvedenie v Sovremennuiu Tochnuiu Metodolohiiu Nauky [Introduction to 
Modern Exact Methodology of Science]. Moscow: Aspect. (in Russian)
Burgin, M., Kuznetsov, V. (1994). Scientific problems and questions from a logical point of view. Synthese 
100 (1994): 1-28. 
De Haro, S. (2020). Science and Philosophy: A Love–Hate Relationship. Foundations of Science 25: 297-314. 
Flügge, Siegfried (ed.) (1955–1984). Encyclopedia of Physics. In 55 Vols. Berlin: Springer.
28
«Epistemological Studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences», 2021, 4 (1)
Françoise, J.-P., Naber, G. L., Tsun, Tsou Sheung (eds.). (2006). Encyclopedia of Mathematical Physics. In 5 
Vols. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
French, S (2020). There Are No Such Things as Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gabovich, A., Kuznetsov, V. (2019). Towards periodizations of science in the history of science. Seroglou, F., 
Koulountzos V. (eds.). Proceedings of 15th International Conference “History, Philosophy, and Science 
Teaching”, Re-Introducing Science: Sculpting the Image of Science for Education and Media in Its 
Historical and Philosophical Background. Thessaloniki, Greece, July 15th – July 19th, 2019. Pp. 585-
594.
Gabovich, O., Kuznetsov, V. (2020). Teoretychna Fizyka [Theoretical Physics]. Great Ukrainian Encyclopedia 
(in Ukrainian). Retrived March 10, 2021 from <https://vue.gov.ua/>
Kompaneyets, A. (2012). Theoretical Physics. 2nd ed. Mineola, Dover Publications.
Kuznetsov, V. (2018). Is the philosophy of science a science? From a view of the Ukrainian philosopher of 
science. Philosophical Dialogs, 17-18: 162-183. 
Landau, L., Lifshitz, E. (1981-1986). Course of Theoretical Physics. In 10 Vols. 3rd ed. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 
Laplane, L. et al. (2019). Why science needs philosophy. PNAS March 5, 116: 3948-3952.
Meyers, R. A. (ed.) (2001). Encyclopedia of Physical Science and Technology. In 18 Vols. San Diego: Academic 
Press. 
Prokhorov, A. M.(ed.). (1989-1998). Fizicheskaia Entsiklopediia [Physical Encyclopedia]. In 5 Vols. Moscow: 
Soviet Encyclopedia and The Great Russian Encyclopedia. (in Russian).
Rovelli, C. (2018). Physics Needs Philosophy. Philosophy Needs Physics. Foundations of Physics 48: 481-
491.
Suppe, F. (ed.) (1977). The Structure of Scientific Theories. 2nd ed. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Vakarchuk, I. (2007). Kvantova Mekhanika [Quantum Mechanics]. 3rd ed. Lviv: Ivan Franko National 
University of Lviv. (in Ukrainian)
Winther, R. G. (2020). The structure of scientific theories. In Zalta, E.N. (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2020 Retrived March 10, 2021 from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structure-scientific-
theories/>
